Abstract. IDEA is a 64-bit block cipher with 128-bit keys introduced by Lai and Massey in 1991. IDEA is one of the most widely used block ciphers, due to its inclusion in several cryptographic packages, such as PGP and SSH. The cryptographic strength of IDEA relies on a combination of three incompatible group operations -XOR, addition and modular multiplication. Since its introduction in 1991, IDEA has withstood extensive cryptanalytic effort, but no attack was found on the full variant of the cipher. In this paper we present the first known non-trivial relation that involves all the three operations of IDEA. Using this relation and other techniques, we devise a linear attack on 5-round IDEA that uses 2 19 known plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2 103 encryptions. By transforming the relation into a related-key one, a similar attack on 7.5-round IDEA can be applied with data complexity of 2 43.5 known plaintexts and a time complexity equivalent to 2 115.1 encryptions. Both of the attacks are by far the best known attacks on IDEA.
Introduction
The International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) is a 64-bit, 8.5-round block cipher with 128-bit keys proposed by Lai and Massey in 1991 [20] . Due to its inclusion in several cryptographic packages, such as PGP and SSH, IDEA is one of the most widely used block ciphers. Since its introduction, IDEA resisted intensive cryptanalytic efforts [1, 5, 6, 8-14, 16, 21, 22, 24] . The best published chosen-plaintext attack on IDEA is an attack on 5-round IDEA that requires 2 24 chosen plaintexts, and has time complexity of 2 126 encryptions [12] . The best published related-key attack is an attack on 6.5-round IDEA that requires 2 57.8 chosen plaintexts encrypted under four related keys and has time complexity of 2 88.1 encryptions [5] . Along with the attacks on reduced-round variants, several weak-key classes for the entire IDEA were found. The largest weak key class (identified by a boomerang technique) contains 2 64 keys, and the membership test requires 2 16 adaptive chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts and has a time complexity of 2 16 encryptions [6] .
The cryptographic strength of IDEA relies on the combination of three incompatible group operations: bitwise XOR, modular addition in Z 2 16 , and modular multiplication in GF (2 16 + 1) where 0 is replaced by 2 16 . All the three operations are essential for the security of the cipher. Indeed, if the multiplication is removed, then the cipher can be broken easily by examining the least significant bits of the words during the encryption. If the XOR is removed, then the cipher is affine over addition in Z 2 16 , and hence, is easily breakable using only few known plaintexts. In [7, 26] it is shown that if the addition is removed then the cipher can be easily broken using multiplicative differentials.
In this paper we present the first known non-trivial relation that involves all the three different operations of IDEA. More precisely, we show that for the MA transformation of IDEA, that is composed of additions and multiplications, there exists an XOR differential with a non-trivial probability.
We use our new relation to devise several new attacks on IDEA based on various attack techniques: First, we devise linear-type attacks on reduced-round variants of IDEA that are similar to the attacks presented in [12, 16, 24] . The attacks are based on constructing linear approximations with bias 1/2 that relates the least significant bits of some words during the encryption process. We use our relation, along with differential techniques and partial key guessing, to improve the basic technique presented in [16, 24] and to establish the best known attack on 5-round IDEA. Our attack requires only 2 19 known plaintexts and the time complexity is equivalent to 2 103 encryptions. Both the data and the time complexities are smaller than the respective complexities of all the previously known attacks on 4.5 or 5 rounds of IDEA. Our attack also has a relatively small memory complexity, unlike the 5-round attack in [12] . We also devise realistic attacks on variants of IDEA with a small number of rounds: A distinguishing attack on 2.5-round IDEA requiring 2 18 chosen plaintexts and time complexity of 2 18 encryptions, and an attack on 3-round IDEA with data complexity of 2
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chosen plaintexts and time complexity of about 2 48.5 encryptions. Both of the attacks are better in some of the parameters than all the known attacks on the respective variants of IDEA.
We also show how to use the same relation in the related-key model. Using two related keys, we are able to extend the linear property by 2.5 rounds. This gives rise to a 7.5-round attack on IDEA requiring 2 43.5 known plaintexts and a time complexity of 2 115.1 encryptions. It is also possible to use our new relation to improve the previously best known related-key attack on IDEA, using the related-key rectangle technique. These improvements can be used to construct a 7-round related-key rectangle attack on IDEA with data complexity of 2 65 related-key chosen plaintexts and time complexity of 2 104.2 7-round IDEA encryptions. The complexities of the new attacks, along with selected previously known attacks, are summarized in Table 1 We expect that the new relation can also be used to improve other attacks on IDEA, as well as attacks on other block ciphers that use the same operations, e.g., the MESH family of block ciphers [23] .
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we briefly describe the structure of IDEA. In Section 3 we present the new relation between the operations of IDEA. In Section 4 we present the new attack on 5-round IDEA. In Section 5 we transform this attack into a 7.5-round related-key attack on IDEA. Appendix A suggests a related-key rectangle attack on 7-round IDEA. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the paper. In this section we present the new non-trivial relation between the three different operations of IDEA. The relation we present is a property of the MA layer. Since the property is independent of the round number, in this section we omit the round index in all the notations. The property is related to the XOR difference between the values in two encryptions. We denote the difference in the word X by ∆X.
Observation 1. Assume that the XOR difference between the two intermediate encryption values in the input to the MA layer is of the form (∆p, ∆q) = (0, α) for some α. Assume also that there is no key difference in the key word Z 5 (but there is no assumption whether there is a key difference in the subkey word Z 6 ). Then:
1. The least significant bit of the value ∆u ⊕ ∆t equals zero. 2. The average probability of the event (∆u, ∆t) = (8000 x , 8000 x ) over all the possible keys is 2 −16 (if α = 0 or if there is a key difference in Z 6 ).
If α is non-zero or if there is a difference in
We note that the first part of the observation is similar to observations that were used in [12, 16, 24] .
If the M A layer was truly random, then the probability of the event (∆u, ∆t) = (8000 x , 8000 x ) would be 2 −32 . Hence, we have a differential with a much higher probability than expected.
The third part of the observation gives a much higher value than the corresponding value for a random function (which is 2 −32 ). The value discussed in the third part of the observation affects boomerang and rectangle attacks.
We shall now provide the proof of the observation: The proof uses the additive difference (module 2 16 ) between the two inputs, which we denote by δX. As there is no XOR difference in the first input word to the M A function (∆p = 0), then there is no additive difference as well, i.e., δp = 0. As there is no additive difference in the subkey Z 5 , then ∆s = δs = 0 as well. As u = t ⊞ s then δu = δt ⊞ δs = δt. We use this relation in the proof:
1. LSB(∆u) = LSB(δu) = LSB(δt) = LSB(∆t), where LSB(w) denotes the least significant bit of the word w. Thus, LSB(∆u ⊕ ∆t) = LSB(∆u) ⊕ LSB(∆t) = 0. 2. Since no assumption on α or the subkey difference in Z 6 was used (aside the fact that there is such a difference), we can assume that the value δt is randomly distributed. Hence, with probability 2 −16 the difference is δt = 8000 x . In this case, δu = 8000 x as well. However, δt = 8000 x is equivalent to ∆t = 8000 x . Thus, the probability of the event (∆u, ∆t) = (8000 x , 8000 x ) is indeed 2 −16 , as asserted. 3. We can write
where the last equality follows from the assumption that Pr[δt = δ] = 2
for every δ. We calculated the last value explicitly by a computer program and got the value Σ β,γ Pr 2 [(∆u, ∆t) = (β, γ)] = 2 −23.72 , as asserted.
Q.E.D.
A New Attack on 5-Round IDEA
In this section we present new attacks on 2.5-round, 3-round and 5-round IDEA based on the first relation established in Section 3.
We start with an observation due to Biryukov (according to [24] ) and Demirci [12] . Let us examine the second and the third words in all the intermediate stages of the encryption. There is a relation between the values of these words and the outputs of the M A layer in the intermediate rounds that uses only XOR and modular addition, but not multiplication. Let P = (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 ) be a plaintext and let C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ) be its corresponding ciphertext, then
Now, if we are interested only in the value of the least significant bit (LSB) of the words, modular addition is equivalent to XOR and we can simplify the
Equation (6) is the basic equation used in all our attacks in this section. For sake of simplicity we assume that the attack is on the first 2.5 rounds of IDEA, but the same attack holds for any 2.5 consecutive rounds of this form.
For a 2.5-round IDEA, Equation (6) is reduced to
). (7) Note that by the first part of the observation in Section 3, if the input XOR difference to the M A layer is of the form (∆p, ∆q) = (0, α) then ∆s = 0. In order to use this property, we consider pairs of plaintexts ( , and hence ∆p 1 = 0. Therefore, the required property holds and ∆s 1 = 0. We note that the same idea was used (to some extent) in [16] .
Similarly, if we take only ciphertext pairs satisfying ∆(Y If the plaintext/ciphertext pair ((P 1 , C 1 ), (P 2 , C 2 )) satisfies both differential relations required above, Equation (7) is further reduced into
This is a simple linear relation that can be checked easily since only bits of the plaintexts and the ciphertexts are involved in the equation.
Based on these observations, we can mount a simple distinguishing attack on 2.5-round IDEA, using the following algorithm: Due to the structure of the plaintexts, for every pair of plaintexts the first differential requirement holds. For every pair of ciphertexts in the same bin of the hash table, the second requirement also holds. Hence, for all the checked pairs Equation (8) should be satisfied for 2.5-round IDEA.
The 2 18 plaintexts can be combined into about 2 35 possible pairs, and a fraction of 2 −32 of them is expected to have ciphertext difference of the form (0, 0, β ′ , γ ′ ). Hence, the expected number of pairs analyzed in Step 3 is eight. If there is a pair for which the equation does not hold, we know for sure that the cipher is not 2.5-round IDEA. On the other hand, for a random permutation, the probability that the equation holds for all the eight pairs is 1/256. Hence, the distinguisher succeeds with probability greater than 99.5%.
Since the second and the third steps of the attack are implemented using a hash table, the time complexity of the attack is dominated by the time complexity of the encryptions in the first step of the attack. Hence, the data complexity of the attack is 2 18 chosen plaintexts and the time complexity is 2 18 encryptions.
A Key Recovery Attack on 3-Round IDEA
The 2.5-round distinguisher can be extended to an attack on 3-round IDEA of the form
by guessing the subkey of the last M A layer and applying the distinguishing attack to the first 2.5 rounds. In this case, the data complexity is slightly increased, since more pairs are required in the last step of the attack in order to discard all the wrong key values. The attack algorithm is the following: Since there are 2 19 plaintexts, then there are about 2 37 possible pairs, and about 32 pairs are examined in Step 2(b). Hence, for a wrong key guess the probability that the equation holds for all the pairs is 2 −32 . Therefore, only few possible key guesses remain, including the right key. The filtering can be further improved by enlarging the data structure by a small factor.
The time complexity of the attack is dominated by Step 2(b) which contains decrypting all ciphertexts under all the subkey guesses. The data complexity of the attack is 2
19 chosen plaintexts and the time complexity of the attack is equivalent to 2 19 × 2 32 × (1/6) ≈ 2 48.5 3-round encryptions. Note that the attack recovers only 32 bits of the master key and the rest of the key has to be found using other techniques.
We note that a similar attack can be mounted on a 3-round variant of IDEA of the form
The only difference is that in this case the attack is performed in the decryption direction. The time and data complexities remain unchanged.
The two extensions can be combined to an attack on a 3.5-round variant of IDEA of the form
However, in this case the data and time complexities are worse than the complexities of the best known attack on 3.5-round IDEA. This follows from the fact that while in the 3-round attacks we could guarantee that one of the differential conditions holds, in the 3.5-round attack this is not the case.
Attack on 5-Round IDEA
In this section we devise an attack on a 5-round variant of IDEA starting with the second half of round 3. Choosing round 3 as the starting point of the attack is the optimal round, as described later.
First, we consider a 4.5-round attack starting at the beginning of round 4. For this variant, the Equation (6) ). (9) In our attack we use pairs of plaintexts with XOR difference ∆(X In order to calculate the required ∆s i values, we guess the subkeys Z However, it appears that all these 15 subkeys use only 103 bits of the master key, whereas bits 100-124 of the master key remain unused. Hence, we can guess 103 bits of the master key, and for each guess we can check whether the equation holds for the plaintext/ciphertext pairs. We note that finding the right subkey requires about 128 pairs for the analysis, which can be constructed from about 16 chosen plaintexts. We also note that starting the attack in a different round would require guessing more subkey bits.
In order to extend the attack to 5 rounds, we guess the subkey of the M A layer in round 3. This does not increase the time complexity since the relevant subkey is composed of bits 50-81 of the master key that are included in the 103 bits we guess in the 4.5-round attack. However, this additional half round affects the data complexity of the attack.
The only remaining issue is getting pairs of plaintexts with difference∆(X i. Partially decrypt all the pairs through rounds 7 and 6, and the M A layer of round 5. ii. Verify that Equation (9) holds for all of the pairs. If no, discard the key guess. (c) If the key guess passed the filtering, perform exhaustive search on the remaining 25 key bits.
As we mentioned before, for every guess of key bits 50-81, we expect that 32 pairs are analyzed in Step 2(b) of the attack. Hence, the probability that a wrong key guess passes the filtering is 2 −32 . Thus, we expect that about 2 103 ·2 −32 = 2 71 key guesses enter Step 2(c). Thus, the time complexity of Step 2(c) is expected to be equivalent to 2 25 · 2 71 = 2 96 encryptions in total. Therefore, the time complexity of the attack is dominated by the partial decryptions of Step 2(b). We observe that this step can be optimized. Note that 1 Note that key bits 50-81 are already guessed.
half of the key guesses are discarded after the first pair, half of the remaining key guesses are discarded after the second pair, etc. Hence, instead of decrypting all the pairs at once, the attacker can decrypt the first pair and check whether the equation holds, then (if the key guess was not discarded) decrypt the second pair and check the equation for it, etc. Using this improvement, the time complexity of this step is 2 103 +2 102 +2 101 +. . . ≈ 2 104 partial decryptions, which are roughly equivalent to 2 103 full encryptions. Hence, the data complexity of the attack is 2
19 known plaintexts and the time complexity is 2 103 encryptions.
5 Related-Key Attack on 7.5-Round IDEA
In this section we present a related-key attack on the first 7.5 rounds of IDEA. The 7.5-round related-key attack uses similar relations as the 5-round known plaintext attack. In the attack we use the difference between the keys to construct pairs of plaintexts for which the intermediate values (when encrypted under the two different keys) are equal for 2.5 rounds. For such pairs of plaintexts, Equation (6) is reduced to a much simpler one. Let the K and K * be two keys such that they are equal in all bits but bit 34 and any non-empty subset of bits {41, 42, . . . , 49}. Let P and P * be the two plaintexts, such that Y 2 and Y 2 * , the corresponding intermediate encryption values after the KA layer of round 2, satisfy: Hence, if the attacker is able to construct plaintext pairs satisfying Equation (10), he can partially encrypt/decrypt the plaintext/ciphertext pairs through rounds 1, 7, 6, and 5 and check whether Equation (11) is satisfied. In order to do so, the attacker has to guess the subkeys Z for the partial decryption. However, these 18 subkeys use only 103 bits of the master key, and hence guessing these key bits and checking whether Equation (11) holds for some plaintext/ciphertext pairs satisfying Equation (10) yields an attack faster than exhaustive key search.
Constructing pairs of plaintexts satisfying Equation (10) is not a trivial operation. However, if we use the known plaintext model and take sufficiently many plaintexts, then Equation (10) may be satisfied sufficiently many times. A naive approach would be to partially encrypt all the given known plaintexts through round 1 and the KA layer of round 2, and to find the relevant pairs. However, even in an optimized manner, this approach would result in guessing 96 key bits, which combined with the known plaintext nature of the attack results in a time complexity of least 2 128 1-round IDEA encryptions. Therefore, we use a modified approach. We use 2 42.5 known plaintexts encrypted under two related keys (a total of 2 43.5 related-key known plaintexts), and partially encrypt them through the KA layer of round 1. After the KA layer, we consider only the pairs that have difference (0, 0040 x , 0, 0040 x ). Such pairs have difference (0, 0, 0040 x , 0040 x ) at the input to the KA layer of round 2, independent of the value of the subkeys Z . With probability 1/2 the difference in the third word is canceled by the key difference, and with probability 2 −16 the difference in the fourth word is canceled by the key difference, leading to a pair that satisfies Equation (10) . Hence, the required pairs are detected in a two steps algorithm. First the attacker guesses the values of the subkeys Z and checks which of the remaining pairs satisfy Equation (10) .
The attack algorithm on 7.5-round IDEA is as follows: 21 · 2 −17 = 16 pairs have a zero difference after the KA layer of round 2, satisfying Equation (10) . For a correct subkey guess, all these pairs should satisfy Equation (11) . For wrong subkey guesses, the probability that Equation (11) 3(a) ). Thus, the time complexity of the first part of this step (finding the pairs satisfying Equation (10) 
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we presented several new results on the block cipher IDEA: The first non-trivial relation involving all the three different operations of IDEA, a known-plaintext 5-round attack, a related-key attack on 7.5-round IDEA (with two keys) and a related-key rectangle attack on 7-round IDEA (with four keys). These results are by far the best known attacks against reduced-round variants of the cipher. Our paper shows that the linear key schedule of IDEA makes the cipher relatively vulnerable to attacks that guess vast amounts of the key. However, despite our findings, the full IDEA still resists all known attacks.
